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An Overview of the Minnesota Rules of
Criminal Procedure
George M. Scott*
As lawyers and judges, we base our professional existence
upon the conceptually fluid course of legal development. We
tend, nevertheless, to cast a critical eye on those practices and
procedures that deviate from the familiar. To some extent, the
new Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, an ambitious effort to compile, modify, and solidify existing statutory and judicial authority, have evoked this tendency. On the other hand,
viewing the rules as a unitary system for the effective administration of criminal justice clearly reveals that their implementation will satisfy the paramount need for just and speedy criminal proceedings.
The many decisions in the last 20 years in which the United
States Supreme Court has broadly interpreted constitutional protections for criminal defendants' have figured importantly in
the recent trend to revise state codes of criminal procedure. Seeking to comply with constitutional mandates from courts haunted
by the "ghost of the innocent man convicted,"' 2 the Minnesota
* Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota.
1. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishing the stopand-frisk doctrine); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) (permitting
the use of reliable informers); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(expanding the application of the fifth amendment to the states); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (establishing right to counsel during
interrogation before indictment); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)
(requiring a preliminary hearing to determine whether evidence offered
for admission violates defendant's constitutional rights); Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (requiring affirmative allegation that the affiant speaks with personal knowledge of matters establishing probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963) requiring discovery of evidence favorable to the accused);
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (providing that indigents have
the right to a free transcript or an alternative record of the proceedings);
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (finding state procedural obstacle not
a bar to federal habeas review of state criminal proceedings); Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (providing that indigents be given the
assistance of counsel for appeal from a criminal conviction); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (extending the sixth amendment to the
states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending fourth amendment
prohibitions to the states).
2. Scott, Introduction, NINNEOTA Ruias or CouRT (unnumbered
page) (1975).
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supreme court and the Minnesota legislature coordinated their
efforts before the adoption of the new rules. For example, in
State v. Mertz3 the supreme court instituted a form of post-conviction relief available after expiration of the time for taking
an appeal; the court sought to prevent interference in state court
proceedings by federal courts responding to a writ of habeas
corpus. 4 The legislature followed suit by enacting post-conviction relief legislation. 5

Unfortunately, implementing constitutional directives by
judicial decision and responsive legislation required a multitude
of hearings and complex, duplicative proceedings involving
unjustifiable expense and delay. To avoid such waste, the legislature took progressive steps empowering the supreme court to
promulgate rules governing the entire realm of criminal procedure. Following legislative guidelines,6 the court consolidated all
statutory and common law governing criminal procedure and
replaced it with a systematic and simplified process for the
administration of criminal justice.
Viewing the new rules as a vehicle to transport a criminal
defendant expeditiously through the system with maximum regard for his rights, yet with regard. as well for the rights of his
accuser, provides a useful perspective of this simplified and comprehensive procedure. For example., the rules attempt to eliminate unnecessary procedural distinctions between felonies and
various misdemeanors in municipal, county, and district courts.
3. 269 Minn. 312, 130 N.W.2d 631 (1964). See also State ex rel.
Duhn v. Tahash, 275 Minn. 377, 147 N.W.2d 382 (1966) (probable cause
must be shown in the complaint and the warrant); State v. Thompson,
273 Minn. 1, 139 N.W.2d 490 (1966) (adopting the rule in Jencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), that the defendant must be allowed to examine pretrial statements of prosecution witnesses); State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 141 N.W.2d 3 (1965) (all constitutional
defenses must generally be considered in one comprehensive preliminary
hearing in district court); State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 1399 N.W.2d 167
(1965) (defendant must be provided an opportunity to learn of prior
convictions to be introduced at trial).
4. The court stated:
Ordinarily we would not review constitutional and jurisdictional
questions raised on appeal when the statutory time for taking
such appeal had expired. It is apparent, however, from recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 [ (1963) (no state procedural obstacles can bar federal
habeas review)] . . . that the issue raised here could be pre-

sented to us by habeas corpus. We accordingly treat the appeal
as a proceeding seeking postconviction relief and consider the
errors assigned.
269 Minn. at 314, 130 N.W.2d at 633.
5. MiNN. STAT. ch. 590 (1974).
6. Mnft.
STAT. § 480.059 (1974).
7. Mumu R. Camw. P. 1.01. For example, the rules standardize the
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The rules also provide for an orderly timetable to ensure rapid
disposition of criminal cases. In felony and gross misdemeanor
cases, an arrested person in custody must be brought before the county or municipal court within 36 hours of the
arrest.8 Within 10 days of his first appearance in county or
municipal court, the accused must be afforded an initial appearance in district court,9 and the omnibus hearing 0 must be held
within the following 14 days.". The trial itself must begin, if
either party so demands, within 60 days after a plea of not
guilty.' 2 The procedure varies slightly in misdemeanor cases.
After the first appearance in county or municipal court,' 3 the
court may order a pretrial conference; 14 in addition, either the
accused or prosecution may demand an evidentiary hearing.' 5
The trial must begin within 60 days or, if the defendant is in
custody, within 10 days of demand.' 6 The rules temper this
apparently rigid schedule with a degree of flexibility. Upon a
showing of cause by either party, a court may order a particular
time period enlarged."" The rules also permit the courts to
excuse a failure to commence trial within the time limitations in
some circumstances.' 8 The scheme is thus designed to dispose
of matters as quickly and efficiently as possible 9 while precomplaint procedure and the probable cause affidavit or testimony (rule
2), the bases for the prosecutorial decision to issue a summons (rule
3), and the procedures upon arrest with or without a warrant (rule 4).
8. Id. 4.02(5) (1).
9. Id. 5.03.
10. Id. 11.
11. Id. 8.04(c).
12. Id. 11.10.
13. If the defendant is not brought before a judge within 36 hours,
however, he must be released upon citation as provided in rule 6.01 (2).
Id. 4.02(5) (1).
14. Id. 12.01.
15. Id. 12.04.
16. Id. 6.06. This rule further provides that a defendant must be
released from custody, subject to the nonmonetary release conditions of
rule 6.02(1), should he not be tried within 10 days of the demand. For
a period until July 1, 1976, the trial of misdemeanor cases within 60 days
will not be required unless so ordered by a judge or judicial officer of
the county court. In re Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure, Order
of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, 299 MAinn. (unnumbered page)
(1974).
17. See Mm. R. C=nw. P. 34.02. Some time periods, however, are
not subject to enlargement orders. For example, the 15-day period provided in rule 26.03(17) (3) during which a defendant may renew his motion for acquittal following a jury verdict of guilty may not be enlarged.
Id. 34.02.
18. Id. 6.06, 11.10. These rules excuse iate commencement of trials
upon "good cause shown" by the prosecution or defendant.
19. Until July 1, 1976 the district and county courts have been
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serving sufficient flexibility to accommodate unavoidable delay.
The rules expand the use of citations as an alternative to
arrest and detention, particularly in misdemeanor cases. 20 For
example, law enforcement officers acting without a warrant
must issue only citations to alleged misdemeanants unless there
exists reason to believe that arrest or continued detention following arrest is necessary to prevent an accused from harming
himself or others, to prevent further criminal conduct, or to
ensure that the accused will appear in court. 21

Before the

adoption of the rules, there were no such conditions on taking
an individual into custody.
The rules have clarified requirements for post-arrest appearances in court. 2 2 A person arrested with a warrant must
be brought "promptly" before a magistrate. 2 On the other
hand, if a person is arrested without a warrant and is not
released from custody, he must be brought before a magistrate
"without unnecessary delay. '24 n neither case must the accused wait longer than 36 hours for a court appearance, unless a
25
judge or judicial officer is unavailable.
The rules have also simplified pleading. In felony cases the
prosecution may use either a complaint2 6 or an indictment. 27
urged to exhibit tolerance for insubstantial deviations from the rules
where a good faith effort to comply can be shown. In re Proposed Rules
of Criminal Procedure, Order of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, 299
Minn. (unnumbered page) (1974).
20. See, e.g., MiNN. R. C~aM. P. 6.01 (1) (1) (a), (1) (1) (b), (2).
21. Id. 6.01(1) (1) (a); see id. 6.01(1) (1) (b), (2). Under certain

conditions, citations may be issued for gross misdemeanors and felonies.
Id. 6.01(1) (2), (2).
22. See id. 3, Comment.
23. Id. 3.02(2) (1), (2). If the court that issued the warrant is in
session, the accused must be brought "promptly" before that court. If
the warrant was issued by a justice of the peace, the accused must be
brought promptly before a court in the county in which the alleged offense was committed. There is no further limitation. If the appropriate
court is not in session, however, the accused must only be brought before
the judge or judicial officer "without unnecessary delay." Id. 3.02(2)
(3); cf. note 24 infra and accompanying text.
24. M nw. R. CRnVr. P. 4.02 (5) (1). There is no requirement that the
defendant be brought promptly before the court even if it is in session.
The advisory committee contemplated that the prosecutor might need
additional time to determine whether to continue the prosecution and
draw the complaint. And in exceptional cases, the prosecutor may seek
enlargement of the time limitation under rule 34.02. Id. 4, Comment.
25. Id. 3.02(2) (3), 4.02(5) (1). The intent of both rules is not to
provide an automatic 36-hour period during which the accused may be
held without a court appearance. Rather, the accused must be brought
before a proper judge or judicial officer as soon as one becomes available within 36 hours of arrest. Id. 3, Comment; id. 4, Comment.
26. Id. 17.01.
27. Id. 2.
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The controversial bill of particulars has been abolished. 28 Additionally, where misdemeanants have been "tab charged," 20 a
30
formal complaint must be issued only on demand.
Perhaps the most significant changes affected by the rules
concern discovery.3 1 Discovery has been made available to both
prosecutors and defendants in conformity with the position recently advanced by the United States Supreme Court:
The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is
not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right
always to conceal their cards until played. We find ample
room in that system, at least as far as "due process" is concerned . . . to enhance the search for truth in the criminal trial

by insuring both the defendant and the State ample opportunity
to investigate32certain facts crucial to the determination of guilt
or innocence.
28. Id. 17.02(4). Information that was normally found in the bill
of particulars, however, is discoverable pursuant to rules 7.03 and 9. Id.
17, Comment.
29. Rule 4.02 (5) (3) describes the tab charge procedure:
If there is no complaint made and filed . .

. ,

the clerk

[of court] shall enter upon the records a brief statement of the
offense charged including a citation of the statute, rule, regulation, ordinance or other provision of law which the defendant
is alleged to have violated. This brief statement shall be the
complaint and is referred to as a tab charge ....
30. Rule 4.02(5) (3) provides that, if the defendant demands, a formal complaint must be issued and filed within 48 hours if the defendant
is in custody and within 30 days if the defendant is not in custody. Unless the defendant waives these time limitations, he must be released
if the prosecution fails to provide a valid complaint within the prescribed
time. Id. To be valid a complaint must comply with the mandates of
rule 2 and must have been issued on probable cause. Id. Until July
1, 1976 failure to file a valid complaint within 30 days of the demand
did not bar prosecution of a misdemeanor case under rule 17.06 (4) (3)
unless so ordered by the judge or judicial officer of the county court.
In re Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure, Order of the Supreme Court
of Minnesota, 299 Minn. (unnumbered page) (1974).
It is unlikely that a significant number of defendants who have been
tab charged will request a formal complaint, for, because of the discovery
permitted under rule 7.03, it will often be unnecessary to clarify the
proceedings. Mmx. R. Cnwm. P. 4, Comment. Moreover, the supreme
court has ordered that no attorney is required to demand a formal complaint when such a demand would be frivolous or otherwise unnecessary
to a considered disposition of the matter on the merits and would unnecessarily inconvenience opposing counsel or others. Order of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, supra.
31. See MniN. R. Cenv. P. 7.03, 9.
32. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970). In Williams the
Court held that a defendant was not deprived of due process or of the
privilege against self-incrimination by the liberal reciprocal discovery
provisions of the Florida notice-of-alibi statute. In Wardius v. Oregon,
412 U.S. 470 (1973), however, an Oregon statute which did not provide
for reciprocal discovery and which prohibited the introduction of alibi
evidence without pretrial disclosure was held unenforceable against the
defendant. The Court reasoned that requiring a defendant to reveal his
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With the exception of the notice-of-alibi statute,3 3 never before
has the prosecution been allowed such far-reaching discovery of
evidentiary matters within the control of the defendant. 34 By
court order, the prosecution may discover evidence of the defendant's physical nature through the use of lineups, voice exemplars,
and blood test.3 5 Moreover, the prosecution may discover the
defendant's case, including the names of witnesses, the identity
other tangible evidence, and the defenses that
of documents 3and
6
will be raised.
The discovery rules also aid the defendant. In the past, the
defendant in felony and misdemeanor cases had been confined
to discovering evidence favorable to his case, obtaining information in hearings to suppress unconstitutionally obtained evidence, and learning of those prior convictions that the prosecution intended to introduce at trial.37 He may now discover the
prosecution's case by direct inquiry before trial, including witnesses' names, 38 documents and other tangible evidence, 39 and
reports of tests and examinations. 40 The defendant may also discover, by court order, evidence that demonstrates innocence, negates guilt, or reduces culpability. 4 1 Upon motion and with notice

to the prosecuting attorney, he may obtain a transcript of the
grand jury proceedings.4 2 And in misdemeanor cases, the dealibi defense when he had no reason to believe that such disclosure

would allow him to discover the prosecution's rebuttal witnesses would
be inconsistent with due process. The Court did suggest, however, that
the statute would be prospectively enforceable if it were construed to
require that the defendant be notified of his reciprocal discovery opportunities. And in United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975), the Court
concluded that the prosecution could be allowed to discover the written
report of a defense witness when defense counsel intended to use the
testimony of that witness to impeach the credibility of key prosecution
witnesses. The defendant by electing to call the witness was held to
have waived the protection of the work.-product doctrine, enunciated in
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), with respect to matters covered
in the witness's testimony.
33. MiNN. STAT. § 630.14 (1974).
34. Rule 9.02 provides for prosecutorial discovery in cases involving
felonies and gross misdemeanors. Discovery in misdemeanor cases may
be had upon motion to the court. Id. 7.03.
35. Id. 9.02(2) (1).
36. Id. 9.02(1) (1) (a), (1) (3) (a).
37. See State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 141
N.W.2d 3 (1969).
38. MAbm. R. Canm. P. 9.01(1) (1). See also id. 9.02(1) (3) (b).
39. Id. 9.01(1) (3). See also id. 9.02(1) (1).
40. Id. 9.01(1) (4). See also id. 9.02(1) (2). The defendant may
still have discovery of his criminal record, but without the need for a
hearing. Id. 9.01(1) (5), 9.02(1) (3) (d).
41. Id. 9.901(2). The defendant may also obtain similar information
without a court order. See id. 9.01(1) (b).
42. Id. 18.05 (2). This rule was designed to supplement the discov-
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fendant may inspect police investigatory reports. 43 Neither
44
party, however, may discover the work product of the other.
The omnibus hearing, 45 a second major development, consolidates into one appearance before the district court 46 matters
formerly requiring a minimum of two pretrial hearings. If the
defendant does not plead guilty at the arraignment, 47 issues of
probable cause,48 Rasmussen and Spreigi motions, 49 and any
other issues 0 that can be heard or disposed of before trial must
be raised at the omnibus hearing. 51 The principal objective of
this consolidation is to decrease the time spent in pretrial procedures so that a speedy trial can be ensured within the guidelines
2
of the most recent United States Supreme Court decisions.
ery provisions of rule 9.01 (1). Id. 18, Comment. The court may restrict
or defer specified disclosure by protective order pursuant to rule 9.03 (5).
Grand jury proceedings have been affected by several modifications
of their established procedures. The "key man" selection process in effect in Hennepin, Ramsey, and Saint Louis counties, which authorized
choosing jurors best qualified by education, moral character, and integrity, has been supplanted by a process of randomly selecting the grand
jury list from a fair cross-section of qualified county residents. Id. 18.01
(2) (adopting the policy expressed in the Federal Jury Selection Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970)). A witness testifying before the grand jury may
request that his attorney be present during the testimony if he waives
his immunity from self-incrimination. Id. 18.04. This practice was specifically forbidden by the controlling statutes, MiVnEsorA STATUTES §§
628.63, 630.18 (3), now superseded to the extent they are inconsistent with
the rules.
43. MINN. R. Cnm. P. 7.03.
44. Id. 9.01(3) (1), 9.02(3).
45. Rule 11 creates the omnibus hearing in felony and gross misdemeanor cases. The advisory committee was of the opinion that the
multiplicity of court appearances that spawned the decision to consolidate the hearings was not a problem in misdemeanor cases. In these
cases, rule 12 provides a pretrial conference when ordered by the court
and an evidentiary hearing immediately prior to trial.
46. Rule 11.01 provides an exception to the general rule that the
omnibus hearing be conducted in district court by permitting referral to
municipal or county courts in specified instances.
47. MnNN. R. Cnvr. P. 11. Rule 8.02 provides that if the defendant pleads guilty, the sentencing and presentencing procedures of rule
27 must be followed.
48. Id. 11.03.
49. Id. 11.02(1).
50. Id. 11.04.
51. If the hearing takes place in either the municipal or county
court, id. 11.01, there is a right of appeal to the district court. Id. 11.09 (1).
If the defendant is not discharged after the omnibus hearing or on appeal, pleadings must then be entered. Id. 11.10.
52. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (constitutional
right to speedy trial determined by ad hoc balancing of conduct of defendant and of prosecution).
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The rules also provide for major advancements with respect
to the insanity defense.53 At the defendant's election, the defense of mental incompetence to stand trial or mental irresponsibility at the time the crime was committed and the defense of not guilty of the elements o the offense charged may be
considered either together or in a bifurcated proceeding. 54 The
prosecution may, for the first time, subject a defendant asserting
the defense of mental illness to a psychiatric examination."
Although this rule abrogates the defendant's medical privilege,58
the defendant is afforded protection from self-incrimination by
evidentiary restrictions on the use of the disclosed information
57
in the proceeding to determine guilt.
After only a few months' experience, it is difficult to calculate the success of the rules. Upon examination of the major
innovations, it nonetheless appears that the desired ends of
simplification and expedience have been met. To ensure adequate testing of their effectiveness, however, members of the
bench and bar should make every effort to comply with the new
procedures and to actively participate in the one-year period of
implementation. Since the advisory committee continues to
serve, the bench and bar should transmit any suggestions for
improvement to it before the rules are reviewed by the supreme
court this year. These rules have been adopted at the direction of
the Minnesota bar; to remain a viable response to current problems, they require the continuing vigilance of that body.

53. IlNm. R. Canm. P. 20. MINNESOTA STATUTES §§ 611.026, 731.18,
and 631.19 did not fully implement the equal protection and due process

standards of Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (same commitment
and release standards must apply to those committed for offenses as to
persons not charged with offenses); of McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972) (denial of due process to continue to hold
petitioner on the basis of an ex parte order committing him to observation without the procedural safeguards commensurate with a long-term
commitment); of Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (one sought to
be committed entitled to jury trial and other procedural protections regardless of the statutory authority for the commitment); or of Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (failure to afford defendant a hearing on
competence to stand trial a deprivation of due process under the fourteenth amendment).
54. Mixx. R. Cnmvr. P. 20.02 (6) (2).
55. Id. 20.02(1).
56. Id. 20.02(6).
57. Id. 20.02(5).

